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S Weapons and Ammunition Security:  
 The Expanding Role of Mine Action
by Elena Rice [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]
Significant expertise is necessary to meet the security challenges posed by unsecured and poorly 
stored weapons and ammunition. To address this threat, many donors and mine action actors, in-
cluding the United Nations Mine Action Service, are including weapons and ammunition security 
management as a core role.
OOn 27 November 1944, an underground bunker holding 4,000 tons of ordnance detonated at the Royal Air Force Fauld underground munitions 
depot in Staffordshire, England. The explosion was the larg-
est non-nuclear explosion ever recorded, leaving behind the 
Hanbury Crater (120 m deep [394 ft] and 1.2 km [1,312 yd] 
wide). While the exact death toll is unknown, approximately 
70 people died.1 Time and time again, accidental explosions 
at ammunition storage facilities have caused death and de-
struction. For  example, in Nigeria in 2002 an armory ex-
plosion claimed 1,100 lives. In 2012 in the Republic of the 
Congo (ROC) 282 people  were killed, and children at a near-
by school were spared only because the explosion occurred 
on a weekend.2
The human tragedy of these events highlights the impor-
tance of preventive measures against unplanned explosions. 
The inside of a damaged ammunition bunker.
Photo courtesy of the author.
1
Rice: Weapons and Ammunition Security: The Expanding Role of Mine Action
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2013
17.2 | summer 2013 | the journal of ERW and mine action | focus         9
However, the immediate impact is compounded by what is 
arguably a more widely catastrophic byproduct of improp-
erly stored stocks. The medium- to long-term security threat 
posed by unsecured munitions holds exponentially more dan-
gerous potential for destabilizing countries and regions, with 
serious implications for international peace and security. 
Proliferation of weapons and ammunition during and 
in the aftermath of recent conf licts starkly reveals the 
dangers of unsecured arms and ammunition. As Moammar 
Gadhafi’s government gradually lost control over Libya 
in 2011, opposition forces and other groups gained access 
to unsecured depots. Looted weapons have since been 
traced to Gaza,  Somalia, and  West and North Africa. The 
U.N. Security Council stated in December 2012 that “the 
continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside 
[the Sahel] threatens the stability of states in the region.”3 
Weapons proliferation fuels insurgency, with the 2012–2013 
crisis in Mali clearly demonstrating the impact of poorly 
stored and easily accessible weapons.
Stockpile Security
With the U.N. General Assembly calling for “practical 
measures” to mitigate this threat, the international communi-
ty increasingly recognizes the challenge and calls upon states 
to make realistic assessments of the potential security risks 
of their stockpiles, while appealing to states in a position to 
do so to assist those with less developed capacity.4,5 Ensuring 
the physical security of storage facilities reduces the possibil-
ity that these weapons will be removed and used for nefarious 
purposes, including as components of improvised explosive 
devices. The role of the mine action community in alleviating 
this risk is apparent and the need to focus resources into practi-
cal implementation in the field is increasingly recognized.
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in-
volvement in weapons and ammunition security management 
draws upon its ability to contribute expert skills, specialized 
equipment, and experience with explosive hazards. Several 
UNMAS-implemented projects focus on securing weap-
ons and ammunition first and storing the materials second, 
emphasizing simple preventive measures such as perimeter 
fencing around formal and informal storage areas. For in-
stance, with the program in Misrata, Libya, UNMAS placed 
secure storage containers inside the existing ammunition 
storage areas (ASA), which were too large to secure quickly. 
Implementing nongovernmental organizations (NGO) con-
ducted clearance inside the ASA to provide space, then add-
ed fencing to increase security around the portion of the ASA 
that was cleared. While extensive damage has already been 
A damaged ammunition bunker in Libya.
Photo courtesy of author.
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done in terms of weapons proliferation from Libya to region-
al conflicts, these measures, implemented at the local and 
national levels, address the ongoing threat in the context of 
Libya’s efforts to restore public security.
The U.N. program in Cote d’Ivoire represents a pivotal suc-
cess for mine action-driven implementation of weapons and 
ammunition management. The HALO Trust (HALO), with 
UNMAS coordination, worked with Ivorian security forces 
to rehabilitate a majority of the country’s storage facilities. 
National technical capacity was strengthened to such an ex-
tent that the state became a regional model for safe and se-
cure ammunition storage and is increasingly called upon to 
share experience and technical expertise. In a strong display 
of South–South cooperation, Chad, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) and the ROC visited Cote d’Ivoire in 2012 
to learn from its experience and apply the country’s methods 
in the implementation of their own national weapons and am-
munition management operations.6 
UNMAS made strong headway in accessing peacekeep-
ing and political funds for weapons and ammunition man-
agement, successfully advocating to the U.N. Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and U.N. Department of Political 
Affairs that unsecured munitions threaten security and sta-
bility and fuel terrorist activities. As a result, the U.N. mis-
sions in Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Libya and South Sudan have 
allocated specific funding to UNMAS for projects that ad-
dress security and storage. UNMAS has in turn coordinat-
ed and implemented these activities through NGOs, such as 
HALO, MAG (Mines Advisory Group) and the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency. As circumstances demonstrate the ne-
cessity for similar projects in Mali and other conflict-affected 
countries, the trend of including weapons and ammunition 
security management funding in peacekeeping budgets will 
likely continue.
The Expanding Role of Mine Action
The term mine action implies that the work focuses sole-
ly on landmines. Many states and NGOs have long advocat-
ed that explosive remnants of war (ERW) and small arms/
light weapons (SA/LW) need to be looked at in unison. For 
Libyan stockpile with artillery shells and a man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS).
Photo courtesy of Nathan Beriro.
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example, the U.S. Department of State 
initiated a comprehensive approach 
to conventional weapons destruction 
(CWD) incorporating mines, ERW 
and SA/LW, as well as physical securi-
ty and stockpile management (PSSM) 
with the consolidation of several relat-
ed offices into the Office of Weapons 
Removal and Abatement in 2003; other 
states have also adopted this approach.
An important step in educating 
the disarmament-focused diplomat-
ic community was the participation 
of UNMAS and several mine action 
NGOs, including MAG and Handicap 
International, in the Programme of 
Action on SA/LW in September 2012.1 
For instance, UNMAS presented a side 
event at the conference: “Preventing 
big bangs and saving lives” focused on 
UNMAS work in Cote d’Ivoire and 
Libya. “Practical implementation les-
sons: armory and stockpile assessment 
in Africa” was organized by the U.K.’s 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
MAG. These efforts represent progress 
in encouraging member states to adopt 
an expanded mine action role. However, 
more remains to be done before the mine 
action community is recognized as a key 
implementer, supporting the weapons 
and ammunition management agenda. 
All mine action actors are responsible 
for lobbying, advocacy and re-branding 
their wide range of work (to include all 
mine action, CWD, PSSM, SA/LW and 
weapons security issues) as critical for 
both security and development.
Second, sufficient and sustained 
funding is essential to the predictability 
and effectiveness of interventions; how-
ever, gaining access to funds remains a 
challenge for those implementing mine 
action. Mine action implementers must 
continue to engage in outreach efforts, 
establish new links with these entities 
and lobby states likely to fund projects 
in affected states.
Mine action work has traditionally 
been funded through a dedicated gov-
ernmental department for mine action 
or by offices dealing with humanitar-
ian funding. Meanwhile resources for 
weapons and ammunition management 
projects are frequently derived from dif-
ferent departments focusing on disar-
mament, nonproliferation, security and 
stabilization. Clear exceptions exist, for 
example the U.S. State Department has 
consolidated CWD and PSSM fund-
ing in one combined budget. Likewise 
U.K.’s Department for International De-
velopment has generously funded arms 
and ammunition management along-
side conventional mine action in com-
bined projects. We hope that this trend 
will continue.
By securing weapons and ammuni-
tion, the mine action community can 
prevent their proliferation and misuse 
by nonstate actors. This role for mine ac-
tion is becoming increasingly recog-
nized by U.N. member states. However, 
more work remains, including accessing 
new resource pools and expanding or 
re-branding the mine action mission to 
correspond with the widening spectrum 
of its activities. UNMAS stands ready to 
assist with these efforts. 
See endnotes page 64
The views expressed in this article are 
those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the United Nations.
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